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1. The Points in Dispute between Two Opposing Views 
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While the majority of the doctrines in our country recognizes that the capacity of 
a company is limited by its objects (the affirmative view)， the opposing views came to 
be advocated in the past fifty years and have been supported by infiuential scholars 
(the negative views).l) The bases of these two oppsing views may be summerized 
as in the following. 
* Lecturer of Commercial Law， Faculty of Law， Osaka University. 
1) S. Tanaka， Kaisha-ho Kenkyu， p.139; K. Nishihara， Kaisha-ho， p.21; K. Osumi， 
Kaisha-ho Ron， vol. 1， p.27; T. Omori， Kaisha幽hoKogi， p.16; E. Hattori， Kaisha・hoGenri， p.
9; K. Ueyanagi，“Kaisha no Noryoku，" Kabushiki-gaisha-ho Koza， vol. 1， p.94. 
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(1) The A伍rmativeViews 
In the五rstplace， the objects of a company provided for in the memorandum of 
association are the core of the unity of its members and it is， therefore， quite natural 
that the capacity of a company should be limited by its objects. This can also generally 
applied to a corporation， for it will be de五nedas an organization under which the mem-
bers unite and to which laws confer the capacity to act in its own name. It is not yet 
the case that J apanese laws confer capacities， without discrimination， upon any social1y 
existing bodies. This is the reason why it is required that the objects of a company 
should be a matter of necessary statement in the memorandum of association (Com-
mercial Law; Arts. 63， 148， 166 par. 1; Limited Company Law: Art. 6). 
In the second place， the limitation of the capacity of a company is useful for the 
adjustment of the interests of the members contributing to it and those of the creditors 
dealing with it. The objects of a company， because of not only being mentioned in 
the memorandum of association but also being publicly announced through registration， 
serve on the one hand as a standard for the determination to contribute of those who 
intend to become its members and on the other as a guide-post for a third party in 
dealing with it. 
In the third place， the a伍rmativeviews rest on the provisions of laws. First， 
although primarily applicable to a non-profit corporation， Article 43 of the Civil Code 
provides th昆ta corporation should enjoy the capacity only within the limits of its 0吋ξcts.
From the nature of a corporation this provision must be considered to be applicable 
by analogy to a company， inspite of the fact thatthe Commericial Code lacks a provi-
sion which allows to apply Article 43 of the Civil Code. Second， Article 72 of the Com-
mercial Code provides that the consent of al the members shall be required for an act 
beyond the limits of the objects of a company with unlimited liabilities. This provi国
sion is regarded as being based upon the assumption that the capacity of a company 
is to be limited by its objects. ln other words， although it is clear that its capacity is 
limited by its objects， the Commercial Code especially includes this provision in view 
of the unlimited liability of an unlimited partnership. Its raison d' etre is to avoid the 
intricacy necessitated by a certain extraordinary act beyond its objects: the alteration 
of the memorandum of a 
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Then， they illustrated it with reference of the forgery of a share-certificate. Thus 
it wil1 rightly be presumed that the original intention of the authors was to provide this 
article as a common theory on a corporation applicable not only to a non-profit corpora憎
tion but also to a company in general. 
( 2) The N egative Views 
In the first place， the thesis that the capacity of a coporation is limited by its 
objects is not a natural consequence fol1owed from the nature of a corporation but 
only a matter of legislative policy. For instance， the countries of the so-called con-
tinental legal systems adopt the principle that a corporation enjoys unlimited capacity 
and even in England where the principle of limited capacity prevails the principle of 
uZtra vires has not been applicable to the corporations incorporated by the Charter of 
the King. In our country， too， itwas not recognized before the enactment of the Civil 
Code that the capacity was to be limited by the objects of a company. Therefore， 
although it is natural that a company should be incorporated with defi泊te0句ects，they 
are nothing but its ultimate goals. Once incorporated and able to act as a member 
of the society， a company must be treated just as a natural person of general capacity 
so as to give ful scope to its functions. 
In the second place， inview of protecting the interests of a creditor， itis more 
desirable not to limit the capacity within the objects and it is as well compatible with 
such ideas of the Comm巴rcialCode as the maintenance of safety and promptitude in 
commercial transactions. Today， when the activities of a company could be extended 
to in many directions and cover a wide area， the adoption of the a伍rmativeviews would 
only give a company an excuse for avoiding liabilities and thus impair to a great extent 
the safety of transactions. In such a case the interests of a third party in transaction 
must be more seriously considered than those of the members of a company as creditors. 
The latter's interests will be protected if they are admitted to claim for damages caused 
by the action of the organ of a company in violation of the memorandum of association 
(Commercial Code: Art. 266) or to ask for its injunction. On the other hand， the 
interests of the other party of transaction could be protected by recognizing as effec-
tive the action beyond the objects of a company. 
In the third place， the negative views rely on the provisions of laws. As to a non-
profit corporation the approval of the competent authorities is required to be given 
to the objects at the time of its incorporation but also to their subsequent changes 
(Civil Code: Arts. 34， 38， par. 2)， for， the preservation of the objects is the public 
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demand. On the contrary， no such requirement is made to a company and while 
the Commercial Code expressly provides to apply Article 44， par. 1 and Article 54 of 
the Civil Code， there is no provision in the Commercial Code which allows the appli-
cation of Article 43 of the Civil Code. The intent of Article 72 of the Commercial 
Code is considered not to extend externally the capacity of a company but to provide 
internally for the procedures on the matters of great concern to a company. 1n other 
words， this provision intends merely to require the consent of al1 the members of a 
company with unlimited liabi1ties， inasmuch as its activity beyond its objects a仔ects
their vital interests. This wil1 be presumed from the fact that the provision is placed 
in the section concerning the internal relations of a company. 
1n the fourth place， there ls no corresponding provision to Article 43 of the Civil 
Code in the German Civil Code which was referred to at the time of the enactment 
of our Civil Code and Article 43 is， therefore， original1y Japanese. A look at the pre-
sent law-making practices in the world makes it possible to understand that the prin-
ciple of the unlimited capacity of a company has gradually been prevailing. Thus， 
Article 43 of the Civil Code must be considered as only applicable to a non-profit 
corporation. 
1. The Trend of Judicial Precedents 
1) The Meaning of “Within the Limits of the Objects" 
There are a great number of cases on this matter and they remain consistent in 
understanding that the capacity of a company is limited by its objects provided for in 
its memorandum of association. 1t is understood， however， that the scope of the capa-
city derived from the specified objects has gradual1y been widely construed. 
For ten years after the enactment of the new Commercial Code in 1899 the capa-
city of a company has been construed to be within the narrow limits to the e狂'ectthat 
a company could carry on the only business partaining to the objects expressly stated 
in its memorandum of association. Thus， asfor a bank， for instance， the assurance 
of a documentary bil1 or that of a bil1 was to be beyond its objects and the bank was not 
to be liable for them. But such framing by means of the mechanical interpretation 
of words did not hen even meet the needs of the economic world and thus impaired 
the safety of transactions. Thus， in1908， a decision was given to the effect that even 
as for a company whose object was not to borrow money for the maintenance of its 
business such an act of the company was considered to be done in pursuing its objects 
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and therefore within the limits of its objects. Then in 1911 appeared a decision that 
the acceptance of liability on the part of a bank through the statement in a check of 
guarantee of its payment was to be included in the objects of the bank by means of 
a fiction that such an act fel1 within the matters concerning deposit or loaning. Th巴se
two precedents were the manifestation of the device to meet the requirement of the 
economic world. Availing these opportunities the time was getting ripe for the reflec-
tion and modification of the view in favor of interpreting mechanically the objects 
provided for in the memorandum of association. 
The way to this tendency was opened by the decisions of the lower courts in larger 
cities and it is observed to influence gradually the decisions of Daishin-in (the former 
Spreme Court). For example， Tokyo District Court gave a decision in 1911 that in 
the case of a corporation whose 0句ectwas to purchase horses the drawing of a bi1l for 
that purpose could not be regarded to be beyond its object. Osaka District Court 
at the same time gave a decision that so long as it was necessary for its business the 
giving of a promissory note was included in the objects of a company ev巴nthough 
such an act was not mentioned in the memorandum of association. It was th巴decision
of Daishinイ'nof December 15， 1912 that marked a turning-point in the existing theories 
of precedents. The reasoning of the decision is as follows:“The memorandum of 
association of a company which includes a fundamental agreement on the kind of busi自
ness it pursues as its objects and on 1tS management is usually to lay down only general 
principles and not enter into details by avoiding verbosity and aiming at brevity. There-
fore， indetermining， by the memorandum of association， the nature and scope of the 
business which a company pursues it is impossible to do so only by referring to the 
original significance of the language correctly mentioned in the memorandum of as-
sociation. On the contrary， th巴 matterscapable of being deduced or inferred from 
the statement of the memorandum could well be considered， though not concretely 
stated in it， asbeing included in the statement. Therefore， itis considered not only 
that the matters capable of being regarded as included in the objects mentioned in the 
memorandum of association should， even if not mentioned in it in the corresponding 
words to the matters， constitute part of the objects 0 
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and on the matters necessary to pursue the matters mentioned as its objects." The 
above-mentioned view has since then been handed down today as the fundamenta1 
position to be taken by the Supreme Court and other 10wer courts. The existing 
theory of precedents cou1d therefore be summerized as fo11ows. “A company pos-
sesses the capacity to carry on not only the matters within its objects specified by the 
memorandum of association but a1so the matters，肝enthough not direct1y be10nging 
to the scope of its objects stated in the memorandum， necessary to carry on the business 
mentioned as its objects. The scope of the objects provided for in the memorandum 
of association should not narrow1y be interpreted by sticking to its 1anguage but should 
be interprぜ edto include the matters capab1e of being deduced or inferred from the 
statement." 
2) Judgement on whether an Act is “Within the Limits of the Objects" 
In judging whether a particular act is necessary or not to carry on the business 
as an object of a company the views expressed in precedents were undergone a serious 
change as the result of the decision of February 7， 1938 as a turning-point. It is 
therefore necessary to 100k briefly at the tr官 ldon this matter by dividing it into two 
terms. 
(A) The Former Term.2) This period covers up unti1 1937. During this 
period the precedents took an attitude that in j叫 gi碍 whethera particu1ar act was 
necessary or not to carry on the business prescribed as the object of a company “there 
was no 1ega1 criterion and it was the matter of fact to be judged by comparing and 
analyzing both the act concerned and the object of a company provided for in its me-
morandum of association，" and that th巴reforethere was no other way than to determine 
it concretely according to each case by considering the nature of the business said to 
be its object and a1 the other circumstances. What makes a problem concerning 
this matter is who assumes the burden of proof. Article 503， par. 2 of the Commercia1 
Code of our country provides that “the act of a marchant is presumed to be done for 
the bene五tof his own business." Daishin幽inconsidered at the begining that the 
burden of proof should be imposed on the part of those who asserted that the act con-
cerned was not for the business， inother words， was beyond the objects of the company." 
But in 1914 Daishin岨inchanged its own attitude and decided that “the provision saying 
that the act of a marchant shall be presumed to be done for the benefit of his own busi-
2) K. Osumi， '‘Kaisha no kenri-naryoku no f王aト i，"SogδHaizrei Sosho， Shふho(3) p. 
17 f. 
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ness should， inthe case of a company， be applied after an act in dispute was determined 
to be necessary for the pursuit of the business as one of its objects or to be within the 
capacity of the company. It was also decided that such a provision should not there司
fore be app1ied to determine whether such an act was necessary for the pursuit of the 
objects of a company." As the result， the burden of proof was to be assumed on the 
part of the claimant maintaining that an act concerned was necessary to carry on the 
business prescribed as one of the objects of a company. As for the means of proof， 
however， itwas considered sufficient， inmany cases， toestablish the facts responsible 
for the act done; for instance， the act was for the sake¥of financing a company or was 
in accordance with the existing business practice. 
In spite of this decision of Daishin-in， however， the subsequent decisions， majnly 
concerning a bi1l， were repeatedly made at lower courts to the effect that since such 
an act of a company was necessary at least to carry on the business as one of the objects 
of a company and should be presumed to be within the limits of the objects the fact 
against it had to be proved by its claimant. The raison dヲtreof this phenQmenon was 
that unless the extent of the capacity of a company was construed as widely as possible 
the requirement of the economic world at that time could not be satisfied. Then， 
Daishin-in too， reversed itse1f and restored to its original view. lt says，“ln case that 
a railway company Intends to improve its financial conditions by means of carrying on 
at the same time the coal-mining business， the latter must be considered to be necessary 
act to carry on the business prescribed as one of the objects of the company. Tlぽ e-
fore， unless under special circumstances， such combining of the management of the 
businesses is to be presumed to aim at the improvement of its五nancialconditions." 
It declares in other occasion， too，“Since it is expressly provided that an act of a mer岨
chant shal1 be presumed to be for the benefit of his own business such an act that a 
company as a merchant received draft and endorses for transfer is naturally to be 
presumed， unless there is no counterevidence， tobe within the limits of the objects of 
the business of a company." 
Such had be巴nthe fundamental opinion of the precedents until1937. The follow同
ing examples are to show what kind of concrete acts were considered to. be necessary 
acts to carr 
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is to be a guarantee for a fabric-manufacturing company as its customer as to buying 
in the materials for processing; (vi) acceptance of a debt by a company for its sister 
company; (vi) acceptance by a company of a debt 0ぱf0抗the引r引 (v吋11註均iり)entering into an 
agreement by a company with its stockholders as to the inspection of books and docu-
me凶 s;(i詠x吟)making a contract by a company to entrust the management of its business 
to others; (x) financing by means of entering mujin (a mutual loan association) by a 
company whose object is to sel fertilizer and grain; (xi) manufacturing of machinary 
by a machine-se1ling company; (xi) in case of a situation under which exportation is 
impossible or disadvantageous， disposing at home domestic goods purchased by a com-
pany whose object is to export and import foreign and domestic goods; (xii) gurantee崎
ing by a parent company as to the debentures issue of a subsidiary company; (xiv) sel幽
ing by a coal-mining and -se1ling company of its sole colliery. 
(B) The Latter Term.3) In the case that a representative of a company whose 
objects were warehousing， transportation and other general business incidental thereto 
purchased heavy oil under the name of the company but actually for his personal 
benefit， Daishinin decided on February 2， 1938 as follows. “The act of purchasing 
heavy oil can be considred in appearance as an act necessary tocarry on the above-men-
tioned business as the objects of the company and therefore should be regarded as 
being within the limits of the objects of the company. Even though the representative 
purchased heavy oil by the intention of attributing the profit to himself through its 
resale， the act cannot be， for this reason alone， beyond the objects of the company and 
be invalid." 
The decision apparently discarded its former position based on the method of 
subjective judgement and on the contrary adopted that of objective judgement. It 
purported to charge a company with duty so long as an act done by its representative 
was considered from its objective nature to be within the limits of the objects of the 
company. It was the epoch-making decision and itspurport was followed and develop‘ 
ped by the decision of the Supreme Court of February 15， 1952. It declared，“Even 
if not included in the ohjects themselves stated in the memorandum of association， the 
act necessary to pursue the objects are to be construed as being within the limits of the 
obj 
3) ibid.， p.26 f. 
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ther it can be objectively and obstract1y necessary judging from the statement of the 
memorandum of association. Because the question of the actual necessity of the act 
is entire1y one of the internal a狂airesof the company and is beyond the knowledge of 
a third party. Because， therefore， the safety of transactions cannot be maintained if 
a third party could deal with the company only after investigating such circumstances." 
Furthermore， the Supreme Court decided on December 28， 1963 that when (i) manu-
facturi碍 ofgeneral wooden goods， (i) manufacturing of shipping goods and (ii) 
investment on the related business and carrying on al1 the businesses incidental to the 
other objects are provided for as the objects of the company， joint or several guarantee 
made on the debt of the others in the contract of lease of land is to be within the limits 
of the objects of the company. It declared， however，“Making joint and several gト
arantee is construed， incase that there is no particular counterevidence， asan act ne-
cessary for the pursuit of the objects." Thus， here， excessively wide interpretation is 
adopted. 
As the result， the fol1owing acts came to be recognized as within the limits of the 
objects of a company: (i) that a company whose objects are extraction and trade of 
minerals carries on the business as a. broker by gathering and se1ling various articles 
when it has no income owing to the business depression; (i) that a company whose 
main objects are warehousing and lease of buildings carries on the trade of socks at 
the time of the business depression. 
Although the precedents consider these acts as necessary for the pursuit of the 
objects of the companies concerned， itis di:ficult to recognize these acts as being within 
the limits of the objects even if judging from the objective and abstract standpoint. 
In recognizing these acts the decisions of the courts based their reasoning on the con-
crete circumstances that the companies in the time of depression took the temporary 
measures for obtaining necessary funds. 
II. Analysis of the Negative Views 
The rise of the negative views in our country as在ninfluential doctrine originated 
from its theorization by Professor 缶詰iTanaka. Its important significance was to point 
out that the existing a:firmative views， which were adopted by the majority of scholars 
ahd precedents， construed the objects of a company too much literally and that such 
4) See M. Takashima，“Kaisha no Noryoku no Mokuteki ni yoru Seigen" M初shoho・
zasshi， vo1. 42， p. 519 f. 
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an interpr巴tationconsiderably impaired the safety of transactions and failed to comply 
with the actual conditions of the economic wor1d. This course of development is cons梢
sidered to be a matter of course in view of the fact that the adherence to the a伍rmative
views has come to be less profitable owing to the actual circumstances that， on the 
contniry to the memoranda of association under the Anglo皿Americanlaws in which 
more individual and concrete matters are mentioned， the matters stated in the memor-
anda of association of many of our companies are rather of abstract and comprehensive 
nature. What is the strongest ground of the a伍rmativeviews and is considered the 
strongest criticism against the negative views is that under the provisions of laws in 
force matters concerning the objects of a company are not only to be provided for in 
the memorandum of association but also to be made public as matters of registration. 
It is refuted， however， that at this point theaffirmative view is not always contradictory 
to the negative views if such requirements are considered to have the only significance 
of notifying the objects of a company to the other party of the transactions. Further-
more， itis assert巴dthat even under German laws which adopt the principle of unlimit-
ed capacity the objects ofa company are also the matters to be registered and that our 
system of registration is not given any absolute e:fect of notification to the public. 
However， inview of the fact that our Civil Code has a particular provision of Article 
43， the negative views may be summarized as in the following three ways. In the first 
place， asthe most conclusive assertion of the negative views there can be cited the theory 
that nothing of the capacity of a company or of the power of representation of its re-
presentative director can be limited within the objects of the company provided for in 
the memorandum of association. This view stands on the same position as the popular 
view in Germany. In th巴secondplace， there is an assertion that the objects mentioned 
in the memorandum of association do not restrict the capacity of a company but the 
power of representation of the representative organ but that such restriction does not 
have e:fect against a bona岨fidethird party. According to this view it is concluded that 
since the raison d'etre of the negative views is to protect a bona-fide third party in deal-
ing with a company it is sufficient to pど
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force and is not at al supported. In the third place， there is a view， while standing 
on the nagative views and yet different from the above-mentioned two views， that the 
capacity of a company cannot be limited within the objects stated in the memorandum 
of association but that the activity of a company is limited， asa common nature to 
al1 the companies， by the purpose of making profit. The Commerical Code， too， 
provides that a company is a corporation for making profit (Commercial Code， Art. 
52.). 
The first view may be said to be based upon two assumptions: first， that Article 
43 of the Civil Code is the provision applicable only to a non由profitcorporation and 
cannot be， asit is， applied to companies; second， that the registration of the objects 
of a company is only for the sake of letting the other party of the transactions know 
them. According to this view， however， itcannot but be understood that the statement 
of the objects in the memorandum of association and the registration of the objects， 
which are common both to non咽profitcorporations and to companies， have two diffe-
rent meanings to both of them， because， for the former， they mean the limitation upon 
the capacity and， for the latter， they only mean the duty of the directors toward their 
company. Such a construction seems therefore unreasonable in the light of the exis-
ting provisions of laws. In this respect， since the German Civil Code. which adopts 
the principle of unilmited capacity provides that， while necessary for a company to 
provide its objects in the memorandum of association and to register them， itis not 
necessary for a nonprofit corporation to register its objects (German Civil Code， Art. 
64)， such a registration is conceivable only as regards a company. Under }apanese 
laws， however， since the common provision as to the effect of the registration of the 
objects is to be applied to a non-pro五tcorporation as having effect agaist a third party 
and， since， asfor a company， the registration of the objects is， apart from the other ma-
tters of registration， tohave only the effect of notifying its contents to the persons 
who see them by chance， such a provision can be said to bring about only a contradic-
tory consequence. Therefore such view will be regarded as unpersuadable. 
The second view admits the largest limitation among the negative views. First 
of al， the fol1owing criticisms may be given on this view. Despite that， in case of 
construing that the obj 
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ration of the objects this view recognizes the1ega1 effect of the registration， incase 
that the representative organ acts beyond the objects of a company， such an act， accord-
ing to the effect of the commercia1 registration in general， ought to be null and void 
and be effective prima facie against every third party (Commercial Code， Art. 12). 
On the contrary， according to this view， such an act cannot be effective against a 
bonafide third party. lt seems， therefore， that more convincing explanation is needed 
for the interpretation of the laws in force. Further， ifthis view asserts that the 
effect of the registration of the objects is different from that of the other com-
mercia1 registrations， then the reason for this must be presented just as in the first 
vlew. 
The third view asserts that the objects of a company may be 1imited by the pur-
pose of making profit common to al kinds of companies. However， the scope of the 
purpose of making profit is unclear. The a伍rmativeview， adopting extremely loose 
interpretation， recognizes at present not on1y that even transactions not direct1y con-
nected with the objects or business of a company are acts done within its capacity if 
they are of the nature of profitmaking， but also recognizes that a company can even 
make contributions to such pub1ic purposes as educational and charitable works. The 
adoption of the third view is， therefore， not pro五tableand if so， the question will remain 
on1y that of superiority or inferiority of theorization. Although it is clear that a com帽
pany is original1y a corporation whose object is profit-making and that the Commercial 
Code so provides， this view which， by strongly maintaining the idea of profit-making， 
recognizes contributions as purely pub1ic purposes not directly connected with the 
business of a company cannot but make obscure the meaning of profit-making. 
IV. Conc1usions 
From the above-traced general trends of judicial precedents and lega1 theories of 
our country the present situation will be understood that the precedents and the majority 
of theories take the a伍rmativeattitudes toward the limitation of the objects of a company 
and that a few but influential theories adopt the negative attitudes. ln tracing back 
the development of these views it may be said that although both the precedents and 
the theories originally adopted the a伍rmativeattitudes， the negative views assume 
greater prominence in order to maintain the safety of. transactions and to meet the 
requirements of the economic wor1d， because the precedents interpreted the words 
of the memorandum of association too formally and narrowly when deciding the limit 
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of the objects of a company. And there is no doubt that the negative views have been 
m貧uencedby German laws. In the construction of laws， however， itmust not be 
overlooked that there is fundamental difference in some important points regarding 
this matter between German and J apanese laws. 
In the German Civil Code even regarding non-profit corporations， the objects 
provided for in the memorandum of association is not considered to limit the capacity 
of a company and therefore the same is true as for corporations in general. Instead， 
it is provided that limitation can be placed upon the power of representation of a director 
as a representative of a corporation by stating it in the memorandum of association to 
the effect that it can be effective against a third party (German Civil Code， Art. 26). 
At the same time it is provided that such limitation on the power of representation 
should be registered (German Civil Code， Art. 64). In the German Law， therefore， 
the objects mentioned in the memorandum of association limits neither the capacity 
of a corporation nor， asa matter of.course， the power of representation of a director 
of a corporation， but has only a significance of being able to limit the power. In this 
respect fundamentally different is the Japanese Law which provides that as for non-
profit corporations the objects stated in the memorandum of association shall limit 
the capacity of a corporation. It is di伍cult，therefore， that the interpretation under 
the German Law should also be valid under the Japanese Law. 
The next question is on the relation between Article 43 of our Civil Code and a 
company. There is no doubt that this article is the provision originally concerned 
to non-profit corporations. The different interpretations arise from the very point 
whether or not this article is applicable to or applicable by analogy to a company as 
apro耐四makingcorporation. First of al， itmay be useful to see that in what considera-
tion it came to be enacted. “Since a corporation is incorporated by the State and laws 
and exists for the achievement of a certain purpose， itscapacity exists only within the 
limits of the provisions of laws and its objects， and it does not legally exist beyond the 
limit …A1though since middle ages the fiction of a corporation had been unduely ex-
panded and a corporation had been considered to enjoy the capacity equivalent to a 
natural person， inmodern times no one came to oppose that a corp 
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though there is no doubt that this article concerns non-profit corporations， in the 
explanations of its authors， theories and precedents勾regardingultraむiresin the Anglo-
American laws are cited and the examples of a company or in particular those of the 
problems of the exte凶 ofthe objects of a company as regards “forgery of a share-
certificate" are cited.5) Even though these are the considerations of the authors and 
theoretically serve only as material for legal interpretation， itcan be presumed that 
they considered this article not only as applicable to non剛profitcorporations but rather 
as the expression of the theory on a corporation in genera1. 
At the same time， according to the explanation of the authors， asfor the question 
of the limitation upon the power of representation of a director as a representative of 
a corporation， ifthis limitation is registered and becomes effective against a third party， 
the corporation comes to be effectively protected but a third party is neglected to that 
extent. In other words， a third party has to ascertain a register whenever he deals 
with a corporation. In actual transactions however， unless they are done on a large 
scale， no one would take the trouble to look at it and the Civil Code does not recognize 
such an institution which limits the power of representation of a representative and 
thus enables it to be e査ectiveagainst a third party (Civil Code， Art. 54). In this respect， 
while German Civil Code provides that such limitation as to be effective against a third 
party may be placed upon the power of representation of a direetor and that this limita-
tion shal1 be a matter of registration (German Civil Code， Arts. 26， 64)， German Com-
pany Code provides that the 1imitation of the power of representation of a dir巴ctoris 
not effective against a third party (Art. 74， par. 2). This has become the basis of the 
principle of unlimited capacity that the objects stated in the memorandum of associa-
tion of a company should not be even interpreted to limit the power of representation 
of a director. In this respect the legal system of J apan makes no difference between 
the Civil Code and the Company Law. Thus the construction of the Civil Code is 
that the objects mentioned in the memorandum of association is a condition of the 
existence of a corporation and is therefore a matter to be considered as the limitation 
upon the capacity by a third party in dealing with a corporation and that the public 
an 
5) See T. Ishi，“Kaisha no Kenri-noryoku" Hogaku烏lokaiZasshi， vo.l 76， p.171 f. 
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There is almost no opposition to the above-mentioned construction of the provi慣
sions of the Civil Code (There are a few views that even the objects of昌 non抽pro五t
corporation do not limit the capacity of a corporation but only lirnit its competence 
to act). Considering the relations between Article 43 of the Civil Code and a company， 
the Commercial Code does not apply Article 43 but Article 54. Thus the precedents 
and theories based on the negative views did Ilot show the reason why Article 43 of the 
Civil Code should apply or apply by analogy to a company except that the article. is 
natural1y applicable to a corporation. Solong as the Commercial Code does not 
include the provision which al10ws to apply the Article 43 to a company， itmust be 
of good reason that there arises the negative view as a sound interpretation in the rela-
tions of companies in which the safety of transactions is the. utmost requirement. It 
may be adrnitted， however， that the adoption of the negative views under the present 
legal system would bring with it a number of above-mentioned di伍cultiesand that 
the views do not have enough persuasiveness. It can be said， therefore， that the af-
firmative views are the most appropriate as an interpretation of the existing laws. 
However， indealing with a company acting as a center of economic transactions， 
the interest of the stockholders and the creditors of a company and the safety of transac-
tions are to be constantly maintained in the interpretation as three important factors 
to be substantially coordinated. 80 long as the Commercial Code does not expressly 
provide for the affirmative view， the problem cannot help but be solved substantial1y. 
In the light of the practice in our country the case is that in deciding the objects of a 
company it is often mentioned that a company can carry on the other business accom也
panying or relating to the objects expressly provided for. In considering whether a 
particular act is within the limits of the 0句ectsof a company， only a few precedents 
called in question a concrete act in relation to the objects stated in the memorandum 
of association and the majority of the precedents showed that a particular act was of 
the nature to be generally recognized as出atof a company as a profit四makingcorpora-
tion. This trend has been more and more expanding. The above facts show that 
the problem is of almost no actual consequences. In this respect， however， the cir-
cumstances will be 
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must be cal1ed in question. 
As to the former question， the m司jorityof theories of our country assert that a 
company can make an appropriate contribution to such a body unrelated to its objects 
or to profit-making as charitable organizations. Their basis is， apart suddenly from 
the problem of the capacity of a company， that living as a social entity a company as 
such can have appropriate relations with other entities just as a natural person does.6) 
But not only under the negative views but also under the affirmative views such an 
argument leaves much doubt. It is di筋cultto understand the argument that while 
standing on the a伍rmativeviews a charitable contribution has nothing to do with the 
objects of a company or at least with those of profit-maki時・ Settingaside the purely 
negative view， italso seems contradictory to assert， while regarding an act to be limited 
by the common object of profit-making， that a contribution of a public nature is immune 
to 1imitation. Although a contribution to a political party is a gratuitous act and is 
therefore not different from a contribution for public purposes， the above view denies 
the former while admitting the 1atter. Under the present circumstancesマ)in which 
there is no 1aw provided for the prohibition of a political contribution but a law regula-
ting the procedure of such contribution on the assumption that the former law isnon-
existent. It seems， however， tobe of no use from the viewpoint of the Commercial 
Code to differenciate these two kinds of contributions. Attual1y， however， there are 
some companies which became bankrupt owing to their excessive contributions to 
political parties. Such is the problem of vital importance regarding the present ques-
tion. It must not be a proper interpretation of the Commercial Code to admit the 
risk that the investing pub1ic should be impaired by the bankruptcy through a gratui-
tous contribution of a company whose 0句ectsis to make profit. In my opnion， what-
ever kind a company may be， itscontribution unrelated to profit-making is beyond 
its capacity and such an act will not be allowed except by means of enactment. Al-
though it must be admitted that the negative views originally intended to safeguard 
transactions and that a third party iri. transaction will be transferred into the position 
of a creditor of a company by recognizing as effective the act beyond its objects， there 
may be the case in which a credit of the same creditor will be 10 
6) J. Matsumoto，“立ri匂aishano Jizen-jigyo ni taisuru Kifu，" Sho・hoKaishaku no Sho-
mondai， p.141 f. Y. Tomiyama， '‘Kabushiki-gaisha no nasu Kenkin (s)" M仇sho.・hoZasshi， vol. 
47， No. 5， pp. 36 f. 
7) The law concerning the Regulation of Politica1 Funds and Expenditures， Art. 22， etc. 
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its objects， and thus becomes bankrupt. If the negative views admit such danger as 
unavoidable， their significance wi1l be lost. Since there is natural limitation upon the 
solution of the problem through interpretation， itwill be necessary to await new enact-
ment and to consider careful1y various interests. 
In our country， with the great revision of the Commercial Code in 1950 as a momen-
tum， the right of management of a company has been transferred largely to the board 
of directors， the possession of stocks and management have been -separated and the 
general meeting has now only the limited right on the matters concerning fundamental 
constitution of a company. And as the result of the popularization of investment 
there increases the number of stockholders who are indifferent with the management 
of a company. As an interpretation of the Commercial Code the protection of such 
public investors must ful1y be considered. If such a case occurs that a stockholder， 
on the contrary to his belief of having invested in a steel company， suffers from the 
bankruptcy of the company which had actual1y been carrying on the whaling industry， 
how can the interest of such a stockholder be protected? The same thing can be said 
about the creditors of a company. They have no doubt less opportunities to take 
part in the alteration of the memorandum of association and the like than the stock欄
holders. 
Considering these points any attempt of new enterprises or transactions beyond 
the objects of a company must begin after the alteration of the memorandum of as四
sociation since its alteration can be effected only through as pecial resolution. Then， 
a stockholder who is against the new enterprise can oppose by means of the resolution 
of the general meeting or can be given the opportunity to resign. By the same reason 
the necessity to protect more effectively the position of creditors has been increasing. 
It is of utmost di伍cultyto interprete the provisions so as to harmonize the safety 
of transactions， the interests of stockholders， and those of the creditors of a company. 
This must be a serious and theoretical problem throughout the world. If it is admitted 
that a corporation or a legal person is to be brought into being only through the State 
and laws， the problem of the capacity of a corporation cannot but be solved by means 
of enactment. It will be of great significance to find out through international coopera-
tion what device will bring abou 
